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Decisions to withhold or withdraw medical hydration and nutrition are amongst the 
most difficult that confront patients and their families, medical and other health 
professionals all over the world. This article discusses two cases relating to lawful 
withdrawal and withholding of a percutaneous endoscopic gastrostomy tube (PEG) 
from incompetent patients with no hope of recovery. Victoria and Florida have 
statutory frameworks that provide for advance directives, however in both Gardner; 
Re BWV and Schindler v Schiavo; Re Schiavo the respective patients did not leave 
documented instructions. The article analyses the two cases and their outcomes from 
legal, medical and ethical perspectives.  
Medical provision of hydration and nutrition not considered an obligatory component 
of palliative care: Gardner; Re BWV 
On 29 May 2003, in Gardner; Re BWV [2003] VSC 173, Morris J of the Supreme 
Court of Victoria handed down an important decision relating to the withdrawal of 
life-sustaining treatment from incompetent patients. His Honour determined that the 
Public Advocate had the power under the Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic) to refuse 
further nutrition and hydration, administered via percutaneous endoscopic 
gastrostomy (PEG), to a 69-year-old woman (BWV) in the advanced stages of 
dementia, diagnosed clinically as Pick's Disease in 1988.  
 
The importance of the judgment is twofold. Technically, it clarifies the meaning of 
the palliative care provisions in the context of the Medical Treatment Act 1988 (Vic). 
More generally, it acknowledges and articulates an evolving international view in 
medical ethics that the medical provision of hydration and nutrition is indeed medical 
treatment, subject to the same criteria of clinical appropriateness and process of 
consent as any other.1 It is therefore neither ethically nor legally required that 
"bottom-line" sustenance be initiated or continued in all circumstances regardless of 
the person's clinical condition, and in disregard of the patient's or family's wishes.2 
The judgment certainly acknowledges that in the practice of palliative medicine it is 
not the norm to provide these interventions for dying persons although oral sustenance 
is always offered, and thirst is treated orally,  
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with occasional fluid infusion if needed.3 The narrow issue of statutory interpretation 
is addressed first, and then the wider implications of the BWV case.  
Mrs BWV had been resident in a nursing home since 1999. Her husband had agreed 
to the PEG insertion in 1995 when she was still ambulant, but incompetent and unable 
to communicate with anyone apart from him, albeit in a very limited form. She 
subsequently progressed to a permanent vegetative state. Her husband stated that she 
had said to him earlier in their life together that she would not want to be kept alive in 
such a condition. He requested that feeding cease. The general practitioner and the 
nursing home management did not agree to this because they felt that there was 
uncertainty about the lawfulness of such an action under the Medical Treatment Act 
1988 in Victoria.  
The Medical Treatment Act4 was enacted in 1988 to safeguard legislatively the right 
of adult patients of sound mind to refuse medical treatment, including life-saving 
treatment. In 1990 and 1992 amendments to the Medical Treatment Act enabled 
competent adults to appoint agents by an enduring medical power of attorney with the 
power "to make decisions about the medical treatment of the person if the person 
becomes incompetent".5 Guardians appointed under the Guardianship and 
Administration Board Act 1986 (Vic) can make "decisions about medical treatment" 
on behalf of the represented person.6 Validly appointed agents and guardians can 
refuse either medical treatment generally, or treatment "of a particular kind"7 where 
"the medical treatment would cause unreasonable distress to the patient",8 or there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that the incompetent person, "if competent … would 
consider that the medical treatment is unwarranted".9 
 
Throughout the Medical Treatment Act, rights and obligations of agents, guardians 
and medical personnel are defined by reference to medical treatment. The term 
"medical treatment" itself is defined in s 3 as meaning:  
(a) the carrying out of an operation; or 
(b) the administration of a drug or other like substance; or 
(c) any other medical procedure – but does not include palliative care. 
The term "palliative care" in turn is defined to include:  
(a) the provision of reasonable medical procedures for the relief of pain, 
suffering and discomfort; or 
(b) the reasonable provision of food and water. 
 
The Medical Treatment Act thus creates a distinction10 between "medical treatment" 
and "palliative care", with the latter excluded from the purview of the legislation by 
the amendment made in 1994, which states:  
This Act does not apply to palliative care and does not affect any right, power or duty 
which a registered medical practitioner or any other person has in relation to palliative 
care.11 
 
Likewise, according to Sch 1 and Sch 3 of the Act, "The refusal of palliative care is 
not covered by the Medical Treatment Act 1988." Schedule 1 contains the refusal of 
treatment certificate, which includes provisions for refusal of medical treatment and 
"instructions as to palliative care". Thus, competent patients are able to provide 
instructions concerning palliative treatment. By contrast,  
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Sch 3, containing the instrument for refusal of medical treatment by agents and 
guardians, has no "instructions as to palliative care".  
 
The implication is that while the Medical Treatment Act allows competent persons to 
give instructions concerning palliative care (but not refuse it outright), agents and 
guardians have no corresponding statutory rights concerning palliative care, as 
opposed to refusal of medical treatment. This leaves the issue of palliative care to the 
common law alone. The Medical Treatment Act specifically provides for the 
continuation of any common law rights. The common law right to self-determination, 
including the right to refuse unwanted treatment or palliative care, has not been tested 
in the High Court of Australia, but has been articulated by the House of Lords in 
Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789; by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Rodriguez v Attorney General of Canada [1994] 2 LRC 136; by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in Vacco v Quill 521 US 793 (1997) and Washington v Glucksberg 
521 US 702 (1997); and by the European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section) in 
Pretty v United Kingdom (Application No 2346/02, Strasbourg, 29 April 2002).  
However, while vesting an absolute right to determine what should be done with one's 
own body can be justified on bioethical and legal grounds of personal self-
determination, it is much more difficult to justify the grant of such powers to third 
parties without effectively nullifying the principle of sanctity of life, which is the 
cornerstone of all common law systems. Morris J noted in Gardner; Re BWV [2003] 
VSC 173 [at 44] that the Medical Treatment Act, combined with the Guardianship 
and Administration Board Act 1988 (Vic), has sought to achieve "an appropriate 
accommodation" between the principle of sanctity of life and the right to self-
determination.  
 
The dilemma before the court was one of both moral and legalistic construction. 
Agents and guardians are powerless to make decisions relating to palliative care under 
the Medical Treatment Act, since this Act only gives agents and guardians of 
incompetent persons the right to refuse "medical treatment". Yet at common law, a 
power of attorney lapses after the donor becomes legally incompetent, leaving the 
guardianship or agency as a strictly statutory institution.  
Thus the case sought to clarify the term "medical treatment" as opposed to "palliative 
care" in order to delineate the scope of the decision-making powers of agents and 
guardians. In particular, the question before the court was whether feeding and 
hydration via a PEG tube constituted "medical treatment" (which an agent can refuse) 
or palliative care (which an agent cannot refuse), for the purposes of the Medical 
Treatment Act.  
 
Morris J first determined (at [76]) that "the use of a PEG for artificial nutrition and 
hydration, or for that matter any form of artificial feeding, is a 'medical' procedure" 
involving "protocols, skills and care which draw from, and depend upon, medical 
knowledge", and "inevitably require careful choice of and preparation of materials to 
be introduced into the body, close consideration to dosage rates, measures to prevent 
infection and regular cleaning of conduits". His Honour then found (at [78]) that the 
administration of artificial nutrition (Osmolite) via a PEG fell within the meaning of 
the definition of "medical treatment" as described in s 3(b), namely the administration 
of a substance like a drug.  
 
Morris J found that the statutory definition of palliative care as "the provision of 
reasonable medical procedures for the relief of pain, suffering and discomfort" did not 
provide a clear principle for a distinction between the purpose of palliative care and 
medical treatment. He determined that such a principle could be discerned from the 
articulation of the natural meaning of "palliative care" in the Victorian Parliament's 
Report of the Inquiry into Options for Dying with Dignity.12 According to the Report, 
the aim of palliative care is "not to treat or cure a patient, but to alleviate pain or 
suffering when a patient is dying. Indeed, palliative care extends to care for the 
relatives of the dying patient" (at [80]). Consequently, his Honour found (at [81]) that 
"the administration of artificial nutrition and hydration, via a PEG, cannot be regarded 
as palliative care, where that expression is used in its natural sense" because "[s]uch a 
procedure is, in essence, a procedure to sustain life; it is not a procedure to manage 
the dying process, so that it results in as little pain and suffering as possible".  
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Morris J further found that para (b) of the definition of palliative care as "the 
reasonable provision of food and water" refers to "ordinary feeding by mouth", which 
may be carried out either by the patient or by non-medical personnel. As such, the 
"palliative care" definition was not intended to overlap with the statutory definition of 
"medical treatment". Only the latter includes medical procedures for the provision of 
artificial nutrition and hydration. According to his Honour (at [85]):  
[T]he intent of parliament in excluding the provision of food and water from 
the concept of medical treatment was to ensure that a dying person would have 
food and water available for oral consumption, if the person wished to 
consume such food or water. It can hardly have been the parliament's intention 
that dying patients would be forced to consume food and water.  
 
Extending the meaning of "food and water" to include artificial nutrition and 
hydration "would produce odd results" and be contrary to the stated purpose of the 
legislation, namely "to allow patients, or agents or guardians on their behalf, to 
choose to refuse medical treatment and to die with dignity". Morris J noted (at [93]) 
that what is "reasonable" in paras (a) and (b) of the definition of palliative care "must 
be determined in the context that such provision is for the purpose of palliative care". 
This will depend on circumstances, and on "the everyday judgment of a fair-minded 
person".  
 
In relation to para (b), Morris J gave an example of reasonable withholding of the 
provision of food and water from a dying patient in circumstances where it is not 
being requested and, when provided on previous occasions, has not been consumed. 
His Honour quoted the following passage from Somerville:13  
[I]f we think of the terminally ill person as suffering from a failed alimentary 
system and the withdrawal of artificial hydration and nutrition as withdrawal 
of artificial alimentary system support, [then] respecting a refusal of this type 
of treatment is no different from accepting a person's refusal of respiratory 
support for a failed respiratory system.  
 
It is important to note, however, that a person may die with a normal alimentary tract. 
In the persistent vegetative state and similar situations resulting from severe brain 
damage, although all oral food and fluid intake is impossible the alimentary tract itself 
may remain both anatomically and physiologically intact. During the dying process, 
the body's physiological systems tend to fail progressively (and the failure may be 
inter-connected) but at variable rates depending on the disease or injury in question. 
Respiration, renal function, feeding and hydration can all be maintained indefinitely 
almost regardless of the patient's condition or level of consciousness, or prospects of 
recovery. The question is whether they ought to be. The answer to this question will 
depend on the considered opinion of the medical professionals regarding diagnosis, 
prognosis and treatment options as well as the documented wishes of the patient or the 
legally empowered surrogate decision-maker.  
 
While Morris J's judgment provides a wide interpretation of "medical treatment", its 
definition of what constitutes "provision of food and water" is literal and narrow. This 
approach is deliberate. Morris J's explication of "medical treatment" as consisting of 
"protocols, skills and care which draw from, and depend upon, medical knowledge" 
encompasses "medical procedures for the relief of pain, suffering and discomfort", 
such as the provision of opioid medication, which the Parliament intended to exclude 
from the operation of the statutory right to refuse.  
 
The narrow interpretation of "food and water" is in line with the South Australian 
statutory definition of "palliative care", which refers to "the natural provision or 
natural administration of food and water".14 Nor can such care be refused under the 
South Australian legislation.  
 
The national implications of the judgment in Gardner; Re BWV are twofold. First, the 
judgment will be of particular importance in the Australian Capital Territory, where 
the Medical Treatment Act 1994 (ACT) contains very similar definitions of "medical 
treatment"15 and "palliative care".16  
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Moreover, the clarified definitions will serve as guidance for decisions on withdrawal 
and withholding of medical treatment at the end of life in other States17 and 
Territories.18 Second, the judgment is significant because it advances the legal 
understanding of the dying process. Morris J pointed out that, although the law has 
recognised that the dying process often involves progressive respiratory failure 
(hence, the recognition that provision of mechanical ventilation or resuscitation is 
often inappropriate at the end of life), the law has been slow to acknowledge that the 
dying process also involves impairment of other physiological systems, such as 
feeding. The judicial notice of this medical fact will be of importance when courts 
decide the issue of withholding of artificial hydration and alimentation at common 
law.  
 
It is to be hoped that the medical and nursing professions, the legislators, health 
policy-makers and hospital managers in Australia will incorporate the findings of 
Gardner; Re BWV in both practice and policy, as the General Medical Council and 
the British Medical Association have sought to do in the United Kingdom.19 There is 
no longer any reason for professionals, patients or patients' families to believe that the 
letter of the law or professional ethics in Australia requires dying patients to be tube-
fed.  
 
Nevertheless, withdrawing or withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration remains 
a sensitive issue with ethical, cultural, social and religious dimensions which found a 
rather unfortunate expression in Schindler v Schiavo (Re Schiavo).  
Judicial and legislative wrangle over withdrawal of hydration and nutrition in Florida: 
Schindler v Schiavo (Re Schiavo) 
Like Gardner; Re BWV, the factual issue in Schindler v Schiavo (Re Schiavo) 780 So 
2d 176 at 176; 26 Fla L Weekly D305 (2001)20 essentially concerns withdrawal of 
hydration and alimentation tubes from an incompetent patient who did not leave 
documented advance directives. The Florida litigation illustrates the inability of even 
well-drafted legislation to deal effectively with the power of family hatred fuelled by 
financial, religious and political considerations.  
 
On 25 February 1990, at the age of 27, Mrs Theresa Schiavo21 had suffered a cardiac 
arrest as a result of a potassium imbalance. Since that time she has lived in nursing 
homes with constant care, being fed and hydrated by tubes. The staff change her 
diapers regularly (at 177). In 2001 the court found (at 177) "overwhelming" evidence 
that Theresa is in a permanent or persistent vegetative state, and that:  
[O]ver the span of this last decade, Theresa's brain has deteriorated because of 
the lack of oxygen it suffered at the time of the heart attack. By mid-1996, the 
CAT scans of her brain showed a severely abnormal structure. At this point, 
much of her cerebral cortex is simply gone and has been replaced by cerebral 
spinal fluid. Medicine cannot cure this condition.  
According to Florida statutes, the husband of an incompetent patient is recognised as 
legal guardian and surrogate decision-maker.22 In November 1992, Theresa's husband, 
Michael Schiavo, successfully sued doctors in negligence, claiming that they 
misdiagnosed his wife's condition. The jury returned an award of more than more than 
US$700,000 for Theresa's care, and Michael received  
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an additional US$300,000. Following the settlement of the malpractice lawsuit, a 
"bitter dispute" ensued between Michael and Theresa's parents, the Schindlers. If his 
wife died, Michael Schiavo would inherit the fund money under the Florida laws of 
intestacy.23 However, if he divorced Theresa (or was replaced as her guardian), the 
fund remaining at the end of Theresa's life would presumably go to the Schindler 
family (at 178). Whether for financial or other reasons,24 within six months of the 
malpractice settlement in July 1993, the Schindlers filed a petition to have Michael 
Schiavo removed as Theresa's guardian.25 The case was dismissed. Since the late 
1990s, Michael Schiavo has apparently been in a new relationship with another 
woman.  
 
As Theresa's guardian, Michael could have exercised his legal power to file a petition 
for a court order to have her "life-prolonging procedures" withdrawn.26 However, 
eight years after Theresa's cardiac arrest, it became clear that the husband and the 
Schindlers could not agree on the proper course for Theresa, and that the inheritance 
issue perpetuated the appearance of conflict. Consequently in May 1998, Michael 
Schiavo, as the legal guardian, invoked the Guardianship Court's jurisdiction to serve 
as the surrogate decision-maker on the question of whether artificial sustenance 
should be withdrawn from Theresa on the grounds that while competent, she indicated 
a wish not to be kept alive through medical life-prolonging measures (at 178).  
Since Theresa never executed a document expressing these wishes, the question arose 
whether there was clear and convincing evidence of her wishes.27 In 2003 in Re 
Guardianship of Schiavo 851 So 2d 182 at 186 (2003) the court emphasised that 
under Florida statutes:28  
It is the trial judge's duty not to make the decision that the judge would make 
for himself or herself or for a loved one. Instead, the trial judge must make a 
decision that the clear and convincing evidence shows the ward [incompetent 
patient] would have made for herself.  
In the event, the Florida Guardianship Court accepted her husband's evidence 
regarding Theresa's wishes,29 and on 11 February 2000, Greer J of the Guardianship 
Court, Pinellas County, made a final order authorising the guardian "to proceed with 
the discontinuance of … artificial life support for Theresa Marie Schiavo". The 
Schindlers appealed, but the District Court of Appeal affirmed Greer J's decision on 
the ground that:  
(1) Mrs Schiavo's medical condition was the type of end-stage condition that 
permits the withdrawal of life-prolonging procedures as defined under 
§765.101(4) of Florida Statutes (2000);[30] (2) she did not have a reasonable 
medical probability of recovering capacity so that she could make her own 
decision  
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to maintain or withdraw life-prolonging procedures;[31] (3) the trial court had 
the authority to make such a decision when a conflict within the family 
prevented a qualified person from effectively exercising the responsibilities of 
a proxy; and (4) clear and convincing evidence at the time of trial supported a 
determination that Mrs Schiavo would have chosen in February 2000 to 
withdraw the life-prolonging procedures.32 
 
On 29 March 2001, Greer J directed that the bio-medical life-prolonging measures be 
removed on 20 April 2001. On 18 April 2001, the Florida Supreme Court refused to 
intervene in the case.33 However, on 20 April 2001, United States District Judge 
Lazzara granted the Schindlers a stay until 23 April 2003 to exhaust appeals. This last 
avenue was exhausted when on 23 April 2003 the United States Supreme Court 
refused to intervene.  
 
On the following day, the nasogastric tube was withdrawn, but on 26 April 2001, 
Quesada J of the Circuit Court, Pinellas County, ordered the treatment to be reinstated 
while the Schindlers pursued a lawsuit against Michael Schiavo, accusing him of 
committing perjury and intrinsic fraud by saying his wife did not want to be kept on 
life-support. On 30 April 2001 lawyers for Michael Schiavo filed an emergency 
motion with the Court of Appeal asking it to order the removal of the nasogastric 
tube. The temporary injunction imposed by Quesada J was reversed by the Second 
District Court of Appeal on 11 July 2001, and the case was sent back to the 
Guardianship Court.34 
 
On 18 July 2001, the Schindlers filed before Greer J a "Petition for Independent 
Medical Examination" and a motion to remove Michael Schiavo as guardian and a 
motion to disqualify Greer J. The petition and both motions were denied on 10 August 
2001. The Schindlers appealed to the Second District Court of Appeal of Florida for 
relief from Guardianship Court's judgment. On 17 October 2001, the Court of Appeal 
affirmed the denial of the motion to disqualify the trial judge and the petition for 
removal of the guardian, but granted the petition to permit discovery and an 
evidentiary hearing by the Guardianship Court.35 In their petition for independent 
medical examination, the parents relied on a claim by Dr Fred Webber, an osteopathic 
physician, "that Mrs Schiavo is not in a persistent vegetative state and that she 
exhibits 'purposeful reaction to her environment'". Dr Webber promised to restore 
Theresa's cognitive function, including "speech recovery", by enhancing "her speech 
clarity and complexity", releasing contractures in her arms and other limbs, as well as 
making the patient better aware of her surroundings through his new "cardiovascular 
medication style of therapy".  
 
The Court of Appeal expressed some scepticism about Dr Webber's claims, and 
stipulated that the purpose of the hearing was to assess Theresa's then current medical 
condition, as well as the nature, scientific acceptability and probable efficacy of the 
new medical treatments described in the Schindlers' affidavits.36 At the evidentiary 
hearing the parents would have to prove on the balance of probabilities 
("preponderance of the evidence") that new medical treatment "offered such promise 
of increased cognitive function that Theresa would have elected to undergo this 
treatment".37 The Schindlers and Michael Schiavo were allowed to designate two 
physicians each, while the Guardianship Court was to nominate a board-certified 
physician in neurology or neurosurgery, with  
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expertise "in the treatment of brain damage and in the diagnosis and treatment of 
persistent vegetative state".38 
 
Instead of Dr Webber, the Schindlers nominated one physician certified in radiology 
and nuclear medicine and one board-certified neurologist. Two board-certified 
neurologists were selected by Michael Schiavo. The Guardianship Court selected a 
clinical professor of neurology at Case Western Reserve University with board-
certification in neurology. Each expert witness was provided with Theresa's current 
medical information, including high-quality brain scans, and each could review her 
medical records, view all videotapes, and personally conduct a neurological 
examination of the patient.39 The Court of Appeal commented : "[I]t is likely that no 
guardianship court has ever received as much high-quality medical evidence in such a 
proceeding."40 
 
Predictably, at the evidentiary hearing, which began 12 October 2001 and concluded 
on 22 October 2002 in the Guardianship Court, all physicians agreed that the brain 
scans showed extensive permanent damage to Theresa's brain. However, while three 
physicians, including the court appointee, testified that Theresa had no living tissue in 
her cerebral cortex and was in a persistent vegetative state with no hope of recovery, 
the two doctors selected by the Schindlers claimed she had a small amount of isolated 
living tissue in her cerebral cortex and was not in a persistent or permanent vegetative 
state. The Guardianship Court's opinion of the videotapes, which may be familiar to 
Journal readers following their broadcast by the worldwide media, was as follows:  
At first blush, the video of Terry Schiavo appearing to smile and look lovingly 
at her mother seemed to represent cognition. This was also true for how she 
followed the Mickey Mouse balloon held by her father. The court … does find 
that these actions were neither consistent nor reproducible. For instance, Terry 
Schiavo appeared to have the same look on her face when Dr Cranford rubbed 
her neck… Also, Mr Schindler tried several more times to have her eyes 
follow the Mickey Mouse balloon but without success. Also, she clearly does 
not consistently respond to her mother… Dr Hammesfahr testified that he felt 
that he was able to get Terry Schiavo to reproduce repeatedly to his 
commands. However, by the court's count, he gave 105 commands to Terry 
Schiavo and, at his direction, Mrs Schindler gave an additional 6 commands. 
Again, by the court's count, he asked her 61 questions and Mrs Schindler, at 
his direction, asked her an additional 11 questions. The court saw few actions 
that could be considered responsive to either those commands or those 
questions.41 
 
On the Schindlers' behalf, Dr Hammesfahr claimed that a vasodilation and hyperbaric 
therapy (aimed at increasing blood and oxygen supply to damaged brain tissue and 
thus facilitating repair of such tissue) would be efficacious,42 and Dr Maxfield stated 
that "there was a significant probability that hyperbaric therapy would improve 
Theresa's condition".43 Unfortunately, both doctors were extremely short on specifics, 
leading the court to conclude that the therapies they proposed "are experimental 
insofar as the medical community is concerned with regard to patients like Terry 
Schiavo which is borne out by the total absence of supporting case studies or medical 
literature".44 The three other physicians testified that, given the extensive permanent 
damage to her brain, there was no treatment available to improve Theresa's condition, 
and that neither vasodilation therapy nor hyberbaric therapy can replace dead tissue.45  
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On 22 November 2002,46 Greer J, having analysed the medical evidence presented at 
the October hearing, held that the Schindlers failed to establish the existence of a new 
"treatment that offered such promise of increased cognitive function in Mrs Schiavo's 
cerebral cortex that she herself would elect to undergo it at this time".47 Since the 
evidence did not support reversing the prior decision ordering the guardian to 
withdraw life-support, he ordered that "Michael Schiavo, as Guardian of the Person of 
Theresa Marie Schiavo, shall withdraw or cause to be withdrawn the artificial life-
support (hydration and nutrition tube)" from her at 3 pm on 3 January 2003. This 
order was stayed on 13 December 2002, pending review by the Second District Court 
of Appeal.48 On 6 June 2003, the Second District Court of Appeal, having examined 
all the evidence on record of the Guardianship Court, including medical testimony, 
brain scans and videotapes ("not merely watching short segments but carefully 
observing the tapes in their entirety"), upheld the Guardianship Court's ruling.49 The 
Court of Appeal stated that Theresa Schiavo:  
[A]fter ten years in a persistent vegetative state that has robbed her of most of 
her cerebrum and all but the most instinctive of neurological functions, with 
no hope of a medical cure but with sufficient money and strength of body to 
live indefinitely, … would wish to permit a natural death process to take its 
course.50 
The Court of Appeal then ordered the Guardianship Court to schedule another hearing 
solely for the purpose of entering a new order for the date of the removal of the 
nutrition and hydration tube. On 15 July 2003, the Second District Court of Appeal 
refused the Schindlers' motion to rehear the case, and on 22 August 2003, the Florida 
Supreme Court denied a review of the Appeal Court's decision affirming the 
Guardianship Court's order to remove sustenance and hydration on 17 September 
2003.51 
The Schindlers then challenged the validity of Florida's laws on life-prolonging 
procedures. However, on 10 October 2003 District Judge Lazzara ruled that he did not 
have jurisdiction to intervene in the case, and the Federal Court dismissed the 
Schindlers' action. The Guardianship Court set 15 October 2003 as the date for the 
withdrawal order to come into effect. The nasogastric tube was removed on that day.  
In the wake of their unsuccessful appeals, the Schindlers turned to politicians,52 
proposing changes to the laws relating to the authority of health care surrogates and 
proxies to consent to removal of life-prolonging measures. They also sought political 
intervention in their fight to reinstate sustenance and hydration to their daughter. 
When, on 3 October 2003, the Attorney General, Charlie Crist, refused to get 
involved in the case, the Schindlers requested on 7 October 2003 that the  
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Governor of the State of Florida, Jeb Bush, enter a stay prohibiting the withholding or 
withdrawal of nutrition and hydration from Theresa.  
 
Then, on 20 October 2003, five days after the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration 
from Theresa, the Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities53 made an 
unsuccessful request for a Federal Court injunction on the ground that removal of the 
nasogastric tube from Theresa Schiavo would constitute abuse and neglect. However, 
on 21 October the Florida State legislature passed the Starvation and Dehydration of 
Persons with Disabilities Prevention Act, which declared that an incompetent person 
is presumed to have directed health care providers to provide necessary nutrition and 
hydration to sustain life. The new provision states:  
(1) The Governor shall have the authority to issue a one-time stay to prevent 
the withholding of nutrition and hydration from a patient if, as of October 15, 
2003: (a) That patient has no written advance directive; (b) The court has 
found that patient to be in a persistent vegetative state; (c) That patient has had 
nutrition and hydration withheld; and (d) A member of that patient's family 
has challenged the withholding of nutrition and hydration. (2) The Governor's 
authority to issue the stay expires 15 days after the effective date of this Act 
[21 October 2003], and the expiration of that authority does not impact the 
validity or the effect of any stay issued pursuant to this Act. The Governor 
may lift the stay authorized under this Act at any time. A person may not be 
held civilly liable and is not subject to regulatory or disciplinary sanctions for 
taking any action to comply with a stay issued by the Governor pursuant to 
this Act. (3) Upon the issuance of a stay, the chief judge of the circuit court 
shall appoint a guardian ad litem for the patient to make recommendations to 
the Governor and the court.54 
 
The Bill was signed into law later that day by Governor Bush who issued an 
Executive Order which directed all medical facilities and personnel providing medical 
care for Theresa Schiavo, and all those acting in concert or participating with them:  
to immediately provide nutrition and hydration to Theresa Schiavo by means 
of a gastronomy tube, or by any other method determined appropriate in the 
reasonable judgment of a licensed physician.55 
 
On 21 October 2003, Michael Schiavo requested the Guardianship Court to enjoin the 
Governor's stay on the basis that the Florida Constitution specifically provides for 
separation of powers,56 which makes it unconstitutional for a legislature to overturn a 
court ruling. The court rejected the request, allowed the nasogastric tube to be 
reinserted, and requested briefs on the constitutional arguments against the new law. 
Thus the sad saga continues …  
 
Gardner; Re BWV and Schindler v Schiavo (Re Schiavo) provide further evidence of a 
growing international consensus, in medicine and the law, that the medical provision 
of hydration and alimentation should be considered medical treatment. As such, it has 
to be subject to the same criteria for implementation as any other medical procedure. 
Emotive images of "starving to death" and of suffering due to hunger and thirst are 
wrong and misleading in relation to patients who are under appropriate 
multidisciplinary palliative care. Morris J in BWV found that the medical provision of 
hydration and alimentation is neither a defining nor required part of palliative care, 
and that each case of withdrawal or withholding of a percutaneous endoscopic 
gastrostomy tube must be treated on its merits.  
 
The case of Theresa Schiavo in Florida shows that, despite medical and legal 
agreement, the power of religious, political and social forces can derail due judicial 
process with potentially negative consequences for end-of-life care that might result 
in prolongation of the dying process of incompetent patients who have no hope of 
gaining any benefit from PEG placement.  
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